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The

American Historical Review

EUROPE, SPANISH AMERICA, AND THE MONROE
DOCTRINE

THE policy of the European powers in the question of the Spanish colonies, the train of events leading up to the famous pronunciamiento known as the Monroe Doctrine, and the effects of that declaration upon the course of contemporary politics, are no new subjects of discussion. The diplomatic action of Great Britain, the deliberations at Washington, have received detailed examination,¹ and of late years much has been done to define more accurately the attitude of the Continental powers.²

But on the latter side the details have not yet been filled in, nor the principles of action determined with exactitude. Just how great was the danger of intervention in the colonies? Exactly what was the positive policy of France, of Russia, of Austria? How far did the United States enter into the calculations of European statesmen? These are questions which deserve a fuller answer than they have yet received.

In such a study it will be desirable to examine only the period between March, 1822, when President Monroe declared for the recognition of the colonies, and June, 1824, by which time the colonial question had ceased to occupy the centre of the European stage. The attitude of the powers at a later period has been clearly shown by documents already published in this *Review* (XXII. 595-616).

¹ On the British side the best special article is by Col. E. M. Lloyd, "Canning and Spanish America", *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, n. s., vol. XVIII., pp. 891 ff. On the American side special attention may be called to the two articles by Mr. W. C. Ford in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine", VII. 676-696, VIII. 53-77.

² See Professor W. S. Robertson's two articles, one in this *Review*, XX. 781-800, on "The United States and Spain, 1822", and the other in *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, VI. 546-563, "The Monroe Doctrine abroad in 1823-1824". Also A. Rousseau, "L'Ambassade du Marquis de Talaru en Espagne, Juillet 1823-Août 1824", in *Rev. des Questions Historiques*, XC. 86-116.

The Continental power with the greatest interest in Spanish America was France. She alone, indeed, of the group loosely known as the Holy Alliance, can be said to have had colonial matters almost constantly in view during the period which it is the business of this paper to examine. An examination of the diplomatic correspondence in four foreign offices, at London, at Paris, at Vienna, and at Petrograd, reveals the fact that Prussia was at all times indifferent; that Austria and Russia began to take an active interest in the South American problem only after October, 1823; but that France was, at a far earlier date, vitally interested in the fate of the revolted dominions of Spain.

French policy in the matter of the colonies reveals from the beginning conflicting interests and points of view which have been too little recognized. No sufficient emphasis has ever been placed on the attitude of the French merchant classes toward the question of Spanish America. There was, as early as 1821, a strong and insistent demand that the markets of Spanish America be opened to French enterprise. There was a considerable body of opinion which looked forward to the recognition of the independence of the colonies as the solution of the whole problem. And this body of opinion, while it did not determine French policy, was always an element to be reckoned with.³

It had, too, its representative in the government. Joachim de Villèle, prime minister during the whole period under review, though a reactionary, was a reactionary of a very practical type. Commerce and finance held the first place in his mind. More than once in his letters the recognition of the colonies is advocated, though often in terms discreetly veiled.⁴

Very different, however, was the view of Montmorency, minister of foreign affairs till December, 1822, and of Chateaubriand, his successor. These men were not indifferent to the pressure of the merchants, they never advocated the forcible reconquest of the colonies, but they were entirely unwilling to admit the possibility of action in the colonial question independent of the wishes of Spain, and in disregard of legitimist principle.

In line with the divergent views of Villèle and his ministers, two policies lay open to France. She might seek an understanding with

³ Paris, Arch. des Aff. Etr., Mém. et Docs., vol. 35, f. 161; undated, must be of about January, 1822. This memoir reveals the fact that agents are to be sent out "to open in the states of South America markets for the products of France, and to make clear the means by which solid commercial relations may be established".

⁴ Joachim de Villèle, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1888-1890), III. 69 *et passim*.

Great Britain, whose commercial interests led her to favor the cause of colonial independence, and march side by side with that power. Or, on the other hand, she might seek an understanding and a settlement of another kind in concert with the Continental powers.

There was here a real choice which lay open. The possibility of an accord with the British government has been too little emphasized. As a practical matter of fact, on no less than three occasions the London Foreign Office made clear its desire for such an accord.

The first of these occasions was in April, 1822. The date suggests that the advances then made may very possibly have been prompted by the virtual recognition of the colonies by the American government in March. At any rate, at this time Lord Castlereagh, then foreign minister, proposed that France and England should consult together, and co-operate in the solution of the Spanish-American question. If some *de facto* recognition of the new states became necessary, such action ought to be concerted between the two governments.⁵

There was much to be said for this proposal. Its acceptance might have altered the whole aspect of the colonial problem, and indeed of European politics in general. But a meeting of the French council of ministers, held forthwith, determined upon rejection. The necessity of common action with the allies, the fear of offending Spain, were given as the reasons for this decision.⁶

A new occasion for a Franco-British understanding, however, was offered at the Congress of Verona. There the Duke of Wellington presented a memorandum on the colonial problem emphasizing the necessity of protecting commerce in the New World, hinting at recognition, and inviting the observations of the allied powers. He seems, too, to have definitely suggested an accord to Chateaubriand. But no accord resulted. On the contrary, the French reply actually committed France to co-operation with the allies, declaring that "a general measure taken in common by the cabinets of Europe would be the most desirable".⁷

After this declaration at Verona, it was virtually impossible for the French ministers to reverse their attitude. A third offer of co-operation, made by Canning on the eve of the Polignac interview, was at once rebuffed. The settlement of the colonial question by a congress of the powers had now become avowedly the basic principle of

⁵ Paris, Aff. Étr., Corr. Pol., Angleterre, vol. 615, f. 204, May 7, 1822.

⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 211, May 13, 1822.

⁷ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone* (Paris, 1838), I. 94.

French policy. Chateaubriand had spoken to Stuart, the British ambassador, in this sense in August, 1823.⁸

What measures would the French government have proposed for the pacification of the colonies had such a congress actually met? Undoubtedly the establishment of independent Bourbon monarchies in the New World. That such was the aim of France has now been definitely established. The idea occurs again and again in the correspondence of the French ministers. It is brought forward as early as 1819 by the Duc de Richelieu.⁹ It is favored in 1822 by Montmorency.¹⁰ It was the favorite dream of Chateaubriand.¹¹ It was the hope of Villèle.¹² In July of 1823 a French cabinet council had approved the project, and the French ambassador at Madrid had been instructed that such was the policy of France.¹³

As to the means by which such a policy could be effected, however, it must be admitted that the French ministers were in general far from clear. There seems to have been an optimistic belief that the colonies would welcome such an arrangement. There was the precedent of the Mexican treaty of 1821, which only the obstinacy of the Spanish Cortes prevented from forming a basis of solution in that disturbed province. Why not use a congress of the powers to urge such a settlement upon both Spain and the colonies?

That it might be necessary to use force in the establishment of independent Bourbon monarchies seems hardly to have occurred to the leaders of French policy. In the correspondence of Montmorency, Chateaubriand, and Villèle over a period of more than two years there is hardly a mention of such a thing. The French premier did, indeed, on one occasion speak of "a few ships and a little money" as desirable—and sufficient—for the enterprise.¹⁴ But barring this and two or three other similar allusions there is no evidence that the use of the French navy was ever seriously considered. There is not a sign that any offer of material aid was ever made at Madrid.

The project of independent Bourbon monarchies was not considered, indeed, as a project of aggression. It was a means of reconciling legitimacy with French commercial interest. It was dependent on the opening of the colonies to the trade of the world. It was, in

⁸ London, Public Record Office, F. O. France, vol. 293, no. 395, Aug. 18, 1823.

⁹ C. Calvo, *Anales de la Revolución de la América Latina* (Paris, 1865), V. 354 ff.

¹⁰ Paris, Corr. Pol., Espagne, vol. 716, f. 27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 722, f. 56.

¹² Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. 200.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. 188.

the language of Villèle, a project "to render more tolerable to France by the new markets open to her commerce the sacrifices which she had made and would still have to make in Spain".¹⁵

The policy of France, then, has now been made clear. But it is worth while examining it from another point of view. How far, in formulating that policy, did the French ministers take into account the United States? How far did friendship or hostility to America influence their action?

That the attitude of the United States was in any sense a major factor in French diplomacy it would be absurd to assume. The despatches of the French Foreign Office in 1823 yield a surprisingly small number of references to the American government. Far less account was taken of the attitude of this country than it might be pleasant to imagine.

So far as the United States was regarded at all, however, it was not with favor or confidence. Chateaubriand had the effrontery to tell Gallatin, the American minister at Paris, that France "would not . . . in any manner interfere in the American questions" at the very time when the scheme as to Bourbon monarchies was under discussion.¹⁶ Villèle declared jealously to Stuart that "the United States labor to counteract our measures, only for the purpose of establishing a system favorable to the democratical principles of their own government, and attaining the commercial objects of which they never lose sight".¹⁷

A more striking evidence of the attitude of the French ministers is to be found in their reception of Canning's suggestion,¹⁸ made at the time of the Polignac interview, that if a congress were held to discuss the colonial question, the American government should be invited to participate. The French ministers were horrified at such an idea. When Stuart mentioned the subject to Villèle, the French premier showed undoubted signs of irritation. "He seemed to think that the meeting had better be altogether avoided if it should be found impossible to take such a measure without the intervention of that power."¹⁹ Chateaubriand was of the same general opinion. "The United States", he wrote to Polignac, "recognized the inde-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Writings of James Monroe*, edited by S. M. Hamilton (New York, 1902), VI. 315 n.

¹⁷ London, Public Record Office, F. O. France, vol. 291, no. 285.

¹⁸ Canning then stated that "he could not understand how a European Congress could discuss Spanish American affairs without calling to their councils a power so eminently interested in the result as the United States of America". *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1823-1824, p. 49.

¹⁹ Public Record Office, F. O. France, vol. 295, no. 557, Oct. 31, 1823.

pendence of certain of the colonies a year ago. They are thus entirely disinterested, entirely outside such discussions.”²⁰ When the Austrian chancellor Metternich emphatically rejected the suggestion of Canning,²¹ the French foreign minister expressed the warmest approval of his pronouncements, even going so far as to declare that the principles laid down might serve “in case of need as a supplementary article of the public law of Europe”.²²

French policy, it is clear from these comments, took little account of the views of the American government. At the moment when President Monroe launched his famous manifesto, Chateaubriand and Villèle were planning a general European congress upon the colonial question, which should pave the way for the establishment of Bourbon monarchies in the New World, and from which the United States should be excluded.

But what of the attitude of the other Continental powers? It is

²⁰ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone*, II. 309–310, Nov. 6, 1823.

²¹ The language of Prince Metternich deserves quotation. “In our view the United States of America can never take part in a European congress, whatever subjects may be treated there; first, because the United States are bound by none of those diplomatic agreements which the European Alliance has discussed and adopted since 1814, and to which are referred practically all questions on account of which the powers come together in a congress; secondly, because the principal aim of these congresses, the maintenance of peace and the established order in Europe, does not concern the United States; thirdly, because in great part the principles recognized and approved by the European powers are not merely foreign but opposed to the principles of the United States, to the form of their government, to their doctrines, to their customs, to the civil and political régime of their populations. There can exist amicable relations between the powers of Europe and the United States, treaties, alliances, engagements of every sort may be negotiated with them, but no common basis exists on which the United States could take part in a European congress.”

“No doubt the United States are more directly interested in the future fate of the Spanish colonies than Austria, Russia, or Prussia, but the interest of these latter powers is none the less real, and none the less worthy of respect. It would perhaps be permissible to say that it is of a more elevated nature. The interest of the United States is that of their commerce, of the increase of their territory, of the extension of their power; it is an interest purely material. That of the European powers, and of the Continental powers as of the others, is an interest in the preservation, in the stability, in the material and moral well-being of the great European family, and if they should assume to deal with the future relations of Spain with her vast American provinces, it is not to divide the spoils, or obtain any positive advantage whatsoever; it is to assure themselves that those relations will not be too far incompatible with the peace and general prosperity of Europe, and will work as little harm as possible to the rights and interests of those governments which, so to speak, created America, and have ruled over it for three centuries.” (Petrograd, F. O., Reçus no. 20616, Nov. 26, 1823.)

²² *Ibid.*, no. 21224, Dec. 25, 1823 (encl.).

worth while to inquire just what their views portended at the time when the American manifesto was published to the world.

In November, 1823, there is, for the first time, what may fairly be called a general discussion of the colonial problem among the members of the Holy Alliance. All the allies had agreed that a congress to discuss the matter would be desirable. No step remained but the actual invitation for such a meeting, which was to come, of course, from the Spanish king.

What would be the point of view of the Austrian government in whatever assemblage might take place had for some months been abundantly clear. The clearest mind in Europe on the colonial question, it might almost be said, was Prince Metternich's. It is the fashion in these days to damn Metternich as a reactionary, but he was at least a very practical one. He had no Utopian ideas as to the reconquest of Spanish America. In July he had told Wellesley, British ambassador at Vienna, that all projects of the kind were hopeless, and that Spain would do well to confine her efforts to the preservation of Cuba.²³ Somewhat later he declared to the Russian representative that Spain should limit her efforts to the retention of the colonies which still remained faithful, and decide, at the same time, frankly to compromise with those which, on terms of mutual advantage, might consent again to become subject to her.²⁴ Finally, in November, he addressed to the Spanish government itself a long memorandum in which he urged such a policy upon it.²⁵ Platonic counsel was Metternich's sole expedient in the premises.

²³ P. R. O., F. O. Austria, vol. 178, desp. 5, July 23, 1823.

²⁴ Petrograd, F. O., Regus no. 20516, Nov. 25, 1823.

²⁵ The colonies are divided into three classes. "There are some wholly under the authority of the King. There are some in which the struggle between the legitimate power and ambitious factions is not yet over. There are some which have constituted themselves independent states, and in which the struggle between the *de facto* and the *de iure* authorities has ceased. The first pre-occupation of Spain should be to assure as completely and as permanently as possible the possession of the important island of Cuba, not only by measures suitable to defend it against unjust aggression, which, happily, it is not necessary to predict, but also by a régime conformable to its present condition, and based above all on the prosperity of its inhabitants. . . . The contemplation of the present and future welfare of the faithful colony cannot fail to strengthen the legitimist party where that party is still condemned to struggle against the partisans of independence; it will serve perhaps to revive the courage of friends of the ancient order in other colonies, where attachment to the monarchy is repressed rather than destroyed." This is all that Metternich has to say with regard to the second class of colonies. With regard to those actually independent he declares, "It appears to us that all that wisdom should dictate at this time is to keep open the question of legal right. It is certainly not over this immense part of the American continent that the efforts of the mother-country can now

Of Russia it is not possible to speak so definitely. Search in both Russian and Austrian archives fails to reveal the existence of any settled policy on the part of the tsar. "Everything is in confusion in America", remarked Alexander to the French ambassador, late in November, 1823. "Let us leave this chaos for a while to reduce itself to order."²⁶ It seems tolerably certain that no positive line of action had been determined upon at this time at Petrograd.

What, then, was the actual situation at the moment when Monroe launched his famous declaration? Were Calhoun and Monroe and Madison and Jefferson justified in their apprehensions of a desperate design on colonial liberty? Not on the basis of the facts as they stood. For Austria disbelieved in the possibility of reconquest; Russia's views had not been formulated; France was seeking a compromise through the establishment of independent Bourbon monarchies in America. And, as it is hardly necessary to point out, she had already in the Polignac interview given a binding pledge against the use of force. The only measure definitely determined upon in December, 1823, was the summoning of a congress upon the colonial question.

The invitation to that congress, in the shape of a formal request for concerted action from the Spanish king, had just gone forth when the President's message reached Europe. It is important to attempt to discover just how the attitude of the powers was influenced by the American manifesto.

One point may be stated with absolute certainty. Austria and France were as determined as ever to exclude the United States from the deliberations of Europe. The Austrian chancellor hastened to assert in lofty terms his objections to American participation in a congress,²⁷ and Chateaubriand told Stuart that the President's message directed with any chance of success whatsoever. In deeming it possible to regain all, she would be practically sure to lose all." (Petrograd, F. O., Recus no. 21221 (encl.).

²⁶ Paris, Arch. Aff. Etr., Corr. Pol., Russie, vol. 165, f. 281, Nov. 28, 1823.

²⁷ Petrograd, F. O., Recus no. 21224, Jan. 19, 1824. "If we have expressed an absolute veto [on the admission of the United States to a congress] our action is justified, not only on principle, but also by the rules of sound policy. The grave question which will occupy the conference is not, in the light in which it is desirable to consider it, an American question; it is, and will remain in the first period of the discussion, entirely European. In the beginning of the discussion the aim will be to prevent all the children of Europe from becoming the adults of America."

"To think of drawing the United States into the council occupied with this important inquiry, to admit even the possibility that they should intervene in it by virtue of any right whatsoever, this would be to commit a great error, to renounce the security which is still to be found in a principle even when the question of fact is no longer under one's influence."

sage "struck at the principle of mediation . . . by peremptorily deciding the question of South American independence, without listening to the concessions which either of the parties at issue might be disposed to admit", and so confirmed his resolution with regard to the United States.²⁸

But, on the other hand, both the French and the Austrian ministers hoped to use the message to persuade Great Britain to accept the invitation to the congress. Metternich declared to Wellesley that if Great Britain should decline "it would be imputed to her that she meant to follow the line taken by the United States".²⁹ "Mr. Canning", wrote Chateaubriand to Polignac, "can have no more desire than I to favor military insurrections, the sovereignty of the people, and all the beautiful things which Mr. Monroe tells us about *de facto* governments." "Point out to him that it would be a very good thing for him to accept mediation with us and the Allies."³⁰

Such was not the view of the British foreign minister. As is well known, he repudiated the idea of agreement with the United States, but he also flatly rejected the invitation to the congress. His action made a formal gathering of the powers impossible. France and Austria were wholly unwilling to participate in a congress without Great Britain. The "System of the Congresses" had come to an end.

But this does not mean that all discussion of the colonial question ceased with Canning's note of January 30. For something like five months more Spanish America still engaged the earnest attention of the diplomats of the Continental powers. There was indeed more serious discussion of actual aid to Spain in February and March of 1824 than at any other time. The President's message at any rate did not prevent such discussion.

It was Russia, whose policy, as has been seen, was still unformed in November, 1823, that was now most tenacious in the belief that some action might be taken in the colonial question. In February, 1824, Pozzo di Borgo proposed that the powers "seek, in concert with the cabinet of Madrid, the means of preparing a *Spanish* force to support the royalists of America, and examine what resources

Association with the United States is dangerous. The spirit of revolt is in their very nature. "It is the basis of their life and the first condition of their existence. It is indeed so intense that only to come into contact with it would be to expose oneself to contagion."

²⁸ P. R. O., F. O. France, vol. 305, desp. 8, January, 1824.

²⁹ P. R. O., F. O. Austria, vol. 182, no. 16, Jan. 21, 1824.

³⁰ "Lettres Inédites de Chateaubriand", in *Revue Bleue*, Nov. 2, 1912, p. 547.

might be devoted to such an operation, and what difficulties lay in the way".³¹ This suggestion was rejected by the other Continental powers as "entailing concessions and sacrifices which they might not be disposed to make in favor of Spain".³² Undaunted by this rebuff the Russian minister urged the Conde de Ofalia to appeal to the members of the Alliance to begin a series of conferences at Paris on the colonial question. But again little headway was made. Chateaubriand was now more and more afraid that Great Britain intended to recognize the independence of the colonies, and that any sign of common action on the part of the Allies would precipitate such action.³³ He refused to take part in any negotiations on the subject of Spanish America,³⁴ and instructed Talaru to observe a like rule of action at Madrid.³⁵

Still the tsar and his ministers seem to have clung to the idea that some kind of aid might be accorded to Spain. Alexander gave to the French ambassador the distinct impression that he was disposed to "advise strongly the sacrifice of every other interest to theories too exclusive";³⁶ and some weeks later Nesselrode, in speaking to the French representative of the poverty and meagre resources of Spain, asked, "Why should not the Allies aid her? What could England say, or rather what could she do, if an army of Spaniards, Russians, Prussians, and Austrians embarked on a fleet lent to the King of Spain, and paid for by his allies, to re-instate him in his rights?" "This idea, extraordinary as it is," remarked La Ferronays, "is one of a number which may have misled the Emperor, and which he would be only too disposed to follow up."³⁷

But whatever the desires of Alexander, the obstacles to the policy he played with were far too great to be overcome. Metternich, as we have seen, had never favored intervention. In a memoir of February 7, 1824, he set forth the arguments which justified his attitude. It was impossible, he wrote to Nesselrode, to act without the aid of one of the maritime powers. England was definitely opposed to armed action in the colonies; France was pledged by the interview of Polignac with Canning. Assistance to Spain would probably mean war with Great Britain. The United States had

³¹ Petrograd, F. O., Reçus no. 21816, Feb. 26, 1824 (encl.).

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Paris, Arch. Aff. Etr., Corr. Pol., Esp., vol. 726, f. 358, Mar. 23, 1824.

³⁴ Petrograd, F. O., Reçus no. 21814, Mar. 26, 1824.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 21814, Mar. 26, 1824 (encl.).

³⁶ Paris, Corr. Pol., Russie, vol. 166, f. 81, Mar. 10, 1824.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 187, May 14, 1824.

expressed itself definitely on the South American question. All these considerations dictated a policy of inactivity.³⁸

From Chateaubriand the Russian ministers received even less encouragement than from Metternich. The French foreign secretary refused even to give assurances that France would not recognize the colonies, and he would have nothing to do with any positive plan.³⁹ Jealousy of British trade led him rather toward a friendly than a hostile policy toward Spanish America. He wrote De Serre at Naples that the acknowledgment of the independence of the new states was only a question of time.⁴⁰ "France," declared Tatistchev, "has subordinated the considerations of policy which we follow, to the counsels of mercantile cupidity."⁴¹

Russia stood, it would seem, alone in her desire for an active colonial policy. Under such circumstances, it was obvious that nothing could be done. In May, 1824, Nesselrode wrote to Pozzo, "Though the Allies, by a strict interpretation of their doctrines, might be bound not to refuse a direct assistance in men and ships to Spain, that power will readily see that so rigid a reconstruction of their engagements will serve no useful purpose while England maintains its present attitude."⁴²

The last phrase in the instructions just quoted deserves particular attention. It was England, not the United States, which occupied the mind of the Russian minister. It was fear of British opposition which led him to abandon the idea of aid to Spain. Nor was it only Nesselrode who assigned more importance to the attitude of Canning than to that of Monroe. Chateaubriand and Metternich did not abandon the idea of a congress on the colonial question with the arrival of the President's message in Europe; they even drew renewed hopes of British co-operation from the message; but their ardor for a congress cooled with the refusal of the British foreign secretary to participate. They, too, paid more heed to London than to Washington.

There is only one respect in which the message may have had a positive influence. It may have stimulated discussion of the scheme for Bourbon monarchies. Certain it is, at any rate, that such discussion is quite vigorous in the early months of 1824. Metternich now favored the project,⁴³ the Russian ambassador at Madrid took the

³⁸ Petrograd, F. O., *Reçus* no. 22337, May 8, 1824.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Congrès de Vérone*, II. 351.

⁴¹ Petrograd, F. O., *Reçus* no. 21874, Apr. 6, 1824.

⁴² Paris, *Corr. Pol.*, Russie, vol. 167, f. 169, May 13, 1824.

⁴³ P. R. O., F. O. Austria, vol. 182, desp. 10, Jan. 21, 1824.

same view;⁴⁴ and Chateaubriand urged the plan with renewed vigor not only at Madrid⁴⁵ but at London.⁴⁶ The French minister, indeed, attempted to use the President's declaration to prove the immediate necessity of sending *infantes* to the New World.

But all such projects were shattered by the obstinacy of the Spanish king. His repugnance to them was "extreme and entire".⁴⁷ His assent, before they could be carried out, was of course essential.

The truth of the matter is that the Continental powers at no time in 1823 or 1824 ever had a practicable policy outlined and ready to be carried out. Nothing, indeed, but reconquest would have satisfied the Spanish king, and reconquest was never seriously considered by any power, unless perhaps by Russia. Even in the latter case, it is clear that there was never any intention to act alone.

As for the influence of the United States on the policy of the Holy Alliance, it was at all times slight. French policy was formed without consulting the wishes of the American government. France and Austria wished definitely to exclude America from any deliberation on the colonial problem, and their determination was only strengthened by the President's message. In 1824 the powers discussed the Bourbon-monarchy plan freely, and Alexander played with the idea of intervention, despite the avowed attitude of the United States. The stand taken by Monroe did not alter in any essential respect the viewpoint of the Continental powers. And, indeed, why attribute to the America of a hundred years ago the power and prestige which appertains to it among the nations of the world to-day?

DEXTER PERKINS.

⁴⁴ Petrograd, F. O., Oubril-Pozzo, Apr. 10, 1824.

⁴⁵ *Revue Bleue*, Nov. 2, 1912, p. 548. "The message ought to open the eyes of the cabinet of Madrid. Can you not show the King that it is far more desirable to place a prince of his line at the head of one of the new states, rather than to let them all escape the sovereignty of the House of Bourbon?"

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* "Mr. Canning has a clear interest in every moderate plan. Can the cabinet of London longer blind itself to the policy and desires of the American government, whose interests lead it with all its might to isolate America from Europe? . . . We believe that constitutional monarchies established in America would be a very good result, both for England and for us."

⁴⁷ Paris, Corr. Pol., Esp., vol. 726, ff. 297 and 324.